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CASTING LIGHT ON THE SHADE:  USING 
SECURITIES LAWS TO DRAW NEW CONTOURS 
IN ART INVESTMENT REGULATION 
Emma Snover* 
 
The disparate treatment of art investments under the Internal Revenue 
Code and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 poses a problem.  This 
disparity generates inequities among art investors and between art investors 
and investors in traditional securities markets.  The Internal Revenue Code 
considers both art and traditional securities to be capital assets with no 
material distinction.  For example, prior to the 2017 tax act, art investors 
could defer the realization of capital gains through like-kind exchanges of 
works of art under section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Currently, 
under section 1400Z-2, an addition to the Internal Revenue Code through the 
2017 tax act, art investors may defer capital gains taxes in the same manner 
as traditional investors by investing their gains from the sale of works of art 
into “Qualified Opportunity Funds.”  These funds are utilized to spur 
economic growth in designated “Opportunity Zones.” 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in contrast, does not recognize or 
regulate art as an investment vehicle with a trading market.  As a result of 
this divergence between two legislative regimes that influence investment 
decisions, inequitable and unbalanced practices can develop within the 
secondary art market.  Art investors may reap the tax benefits of investing in 
art without being subject to any modified securities laws or regulations, such 
as those concerning trading on or tipping material, nonpublic information. 
This Note compares the tax treatment of art with the insider trading laws 
and regulations that apply to traditional securities and explores the potential 
of adapting those laws and regulations to fit the growing secondary art 
market. It concludes that increased regulation of the secondary art market 
would (1) synergize investing practices with the tax benefits of those 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you have a sizable and impressive private art collection for 
investment purposes.  You are familiar with the tax implications of your art 
collection, such as paying capital gains taxes when you periodically sell 
works in your collection.  Now, one of New York City’s top art museums has 
invited you to join its board of directors.  Through this position, you may 
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learn which genres and artists will be most prominently featured at the 
museum over the next few years.1  You may also acquire special access to 
top artists and their studios.2  How might this insider knowledge impact your 
investments in the secondary art market,3 recognizing that there are no 
regulations regarding your use of material, nonpublic information in trading 
art? 
The art market has grown substantially in the twenty-first century, 
reaching an estimated $67.4 billion globally in 2018.4  In that same year, the 
United States represented the single largest art market, capturing 44 percent 
of the global market share.5  From a tax perspective, Congress implicitly 
views this sizable market as a trading market, and art itself as investment 
property, because the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) does not create 
any material distinction between art and other tradable investment assets.6  
Though art, as a collectible, may be subject to a different capital gains tax 
rate than traditional securities,7 its classification as a capital asset and the 
process of its tax assessment remain synonymous with traditional securities.8  
Art transactions, for example, generate investment gains and losses just like 
traditional securities.9  Despite some changes, the 2017 tax act reinforces this 
perspective.10  This tax approach to art demonstrates that although art may 
provide investors with incalculable personal satisfaction, art also provides 
investors with satisfying opportunities for capital gains (or dissatisfying 
losses) in the secondary trading market. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hannah Furness, Art World Is “Hotbed” of Corruption, Collector Claims, 
TELEGRAPH (June 2, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/02/art-world-is-
hotbed-of-corruption-collector-claims [https://perma.cc/3HAZ-EZRL]. 
 2. See Robin Pogrebin, Elizabeth A. Harris & Graham Bowley, New Scrutiny of Museum 
Boards Takes Aim at World of Wealth and Status, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/arts/design/whitney-art-museums-trustees.html 
[https://perma.cc/B3BE-L53S]. 
 3. This Note is concerned with transfers in the secondary art market, either at auction or 
in private sales, rather than initial sales in the primary market. See infra Part I.C (defining the 
primary and secondary art markets). 
 4. Press Release, Art Basel, The Art Market 2019: Global Art Market Reaches Its Second 
Highest Level in 10 Years, Amidst Further Consolidation at the Top End (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://d2u3kfwd92fzu7.cloudfront.net/The%20Art%20Market%202019_Press%20Release-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW6R-RWE7]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2018). 
 7. See id. § 1(h)(5)(A); see also id. § 408(m)(2)(A). 
 8. See id. § 1221(a); see also id. § 1222. 
 9. See id. § 1222; see also Estate of Elkins v. Comm’r, 767 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming the tax court’s decision to allow a fractional-ownership discount to assess the 
taxable value of a decedent’s fractional interests in sixty-four works of art).  Estate of Elkins 
indicates the development of art as an “asset class,” rather than an asset that cannot be owned 
in fractional interests. Moses Luski, Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:  
Cautionary Tale and Gem, INSIGHTS (Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Charlotte, N.C.), 
Spring 2015, at 1, 2. 
 10. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.).  The 2017 tax revisions are commonly known as the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act.  To remain technically accurate, this Note will refer to these revisions as the 2017 
tax act. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
11 (8th ed. 2018). 
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In contrast, Congress has not imputed this trading and investment 
perspective of the secondary art market to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“the Act”) or to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) more 
broadly.11  The limited scope of the Act impedes the SEC’s ability to regulate 
the secondary art market.  Notwithstanding some important distinctions to be 
discussed,12 as art transactions become more prevalent in individual 
investment portfolios and the secondary art market increasingly resembles 
trading in traditional securities markets,13 this discrepancy should be 
addressed. 
For years, there have been discussions of increasing regulations in various 
corners of the art market.14  At the turn of the century, rival auction houses 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s paid $512 million to settle a collusion suit15 and a 
Sotheby’s executive was criminally convicted of collusion,16 flagging the art 
market as an industry in need of increased regulation.  More recently, Nouriel 
Roubini, an economist at New York University, has emphasized that 
practices within the art market would not be permitted in other financial 
markets.17  Others have concurred with Roubini in considering the art market 
to be an “informal economy.”18  In December 2019, the New York Times 
published an opinion piece exposing the development of inequitable 
practices among directors, who are often also art collectors and investors, at 
American museums.19  No compelling public policy or economic reasoning 
justifies the absence of regulation in this arena. 
This Note explores the divergence between the tax treatment of art 
transactions and the absence of any modified securities laws or regulations, 
particularly those concerning insider trading, in the secondary art market.  As 
the mandates of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the SEC share 
 
 11. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018), with 
I.R.C. §§ 1221(a), 1400Z. 
 12. See infra Part II.D. 
 13. See, e.g., Press Release, Art Basel, supra note 4. 
 14. See Marc Spiegler, Time To Reform the Art Market?, FORBES (May 30, 2005), 
https://www.forbes.com/2005/05/30/cx_0530conn_ls.html [https://perma.cc/7BGY-SBRX] 
(quoting Greg Allen, a former financier and co-chair of the Junior Associates Board at the 
Museum of Modern Art, who said “people coming from the finance world into the art market 
tend to be shocked by the level of opacity and murkiness”); see also John Gapper & Peter 
Aspden, Davos 2015:  Nouriel Roubini Says Art Market Needs Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 
22, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/992dcf86-a250-11e4-aba2-00144feab7de [https:// 
perma.cc/RVE5-CCYK]. 
 15. Vanessa O’Connell, Christie’s, Sotheby’s Agree to Pay $512 Million Collusion 
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB96982962 
0926708015 [https://perma.cc/ZPL6-SKM5]. 
 16. DOUG WOODHAM, ART COLLECTING TODAY:  MARKET INSIGHTS FOR EVERYONE 
PASSIONATE ABOUT ART 31 (2017). 
 17. Gapper & Aspden, supra note 14. 
 18. Artsy Editors, What Actually Happens in the Art Market’s Informal Economy, ARTSY 
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-art-markets-informal-economy 
[https://perma.cc/BQ39-VXDL]. 
 19. Michael Massing, Opinion, How the Superrich Took over the Museum World, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/14/opinion/sunday/modern-art-
museum.html [https://perma.cc/WKL9-VU3R]. 
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principles of equity, efficiency, and transparency, this Note finds the 
practices resulting from this divergence to be particularly alarming.20  The 
current absence of regulation in the secondary art market makes it difficult 
to address any specific instance of insider trading in this market.  However, 
this Note takes a proactive approach to resolving a regulatory deficiency in a 
growing trading and investment markets, which is especially relevant as 
debates about these principles ripen in public discourse in the context of the 
2020 presidential election.21 
Part I provides essential background information about federal income 
taxation, securities law, and the art market.  Part II uses this background to 
critique the disparate treatment of the same asset (art) by two different federal 
agencies (the IRS and the SEC).  Part III unveils an integrated resolution by 
discussing relevant policy considerations and recommends that Congress 
look to the Code to expand the scope of the Act and subject the secondary art 
market to modified insider trading regulations.  This resolution posits that 
increased regulation of the secondary art market best acknowledges the 
market for what it is:  a lucrative platform for investment, which generates a 
strong trading market and is one that is best enhanced by fair and balanced 
regulation, rather than compromised by its absence. 
I.  PAINTING THE PICTURE:  TAX, SECURITIES, AND THE ART MARKET 
To understand the disparate treatment of art investments under the Code 
and securities laws, an overview of each of these elements is first necessary.  
Part I.A introduces important tax concepts and provides a brief history of 
federal income taxation.  Part I.B discusses central concepts within securities 
law.  Part I.C defines the art market and its related terms. 
A.  Tax Concepts and a Brief History of Taxation 
Though the background and history of taxation may seem distant from the 
notion of modifying securities laws and regulations to fit the secondary art 
market, tradable investment assets, like art, became a source of taxable 
income under the Code.22  Understanding the Code’s treatment of art 
therefore illuminates a path to inform the Act’s application to the secondary 
art market. 
 
 20. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 28–30; see also What We Do, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J3E6-KJF8] (last updated June 10, 2013). 
 21. See, e.g., Scott Eastman, Unpacking Biden’s Tax Plan for Capital Gains, TAX FOUND. 
(July 31, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/joe-biden-tax-proposals [https://perma.cc/J9UE-
59HX]; Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on a Wealth Tax, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-wealth-tax.html 
[https://perma.cc/NVB7-TL4S]. 
 22. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012) (summarizing 
the history of how personal property became a source of taxable income). 
1514 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
1.  Basic Concepts 
The Code comprises the body of federal taxation statutes in the United 
States.  The Code has continuously evolved since its initial implementation 
in 1939.23  Though the Department of the Treasury has the statutory authority 
to administer and enforce the Code, Congress grants the Treasury the 
authority to delegate its responsibilities.24  The Treasury has, in turn, 
delegated many of these responsibilities to the IRS.25  As a result of this 
delegated authority, the IRS prescribes rules and regulations for the 
administration of the Code, interprets Code provisions, and clarifies the 
Code’s applicability to various situations.26 
Under the Code, art is a capital asset.27  A capital asset generates taxable 
income when the asset is sold or otherwise disposed of at a profit,28 subject 
to some exceptions.29  A taxpayer realizes a capital gain when the taxpayer’s 
adjusted basis in the asset (the amount that the taxpayer pays for the asset 
less any depreciation deductions or plus any capital expenditures) is less than 
the amount realized when the taxpayer sells or disposes of the asset.30 
The taxpayer’s holding period of the asset affects the rate at which the gain 
is taxed.31  A taxpayer must hold an asset for more than one year to benefit 
from a preferential long-term capital gains tax rate.32  That long-term capital 
gains rate hinges on the taxpayer’s ordinary income tax bracket.33  For 
collectibles such as art, the maximum capital gains tax rate is 28 percent.34  
 
 23. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (amended 
2017); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3 (amended 1986); Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 1 (amended 1954). 
 24. I.R.C. § 7801(a)(1) (2018). 
 25. Id. § 7803. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. § 1221; see also Capital Gains and Losses—10 Helpful Facts to Know, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/capital-gains-and-
losses-10-helpful-facts-to-know-0 [https://perma.cc/7GAX-QUXS]; Topic No. 409 Capital 
Gains and Losses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 [https:// 
perma.cc/VQ8P-F7LJ] (last updated Jan. 3, 2020). 
 28. See I.R.C. § 63; see also Merchs.’ Loan & Tr. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 516 
(1921) (holding that taxation on gains acquired from the sale or disposition of property is 
constitutional). 
 29. Publication 544 (2018), Sales and Other Dispositions of Assets, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications/p544 [https://perma.cc/2G55-P3DQ] (last updated 
Dec. 19, 2019) (describing the difference between ordinary and capital gain or loss). 
 30. See I.R.C. § 1001. 
 31. See id. § 1223. 
 32. See id. §§ 1222–1223. 
 33. See Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and Losses, supra note 27. 
 34. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(4); see also Topic No. 409 Capital Gains and Losses, supra note 27.  
At least one legislative attempt has been made to synchronize capital gains tax rates for art 
and other investment property. See Art and Collectibles Capital Gains Tax Treatment Parity 
Act, S. 374, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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In some cases in which a taxpayer’s income exceeds a threshold amount, an 
additional 3.8 percent investment tax also applies to the capital gain.35 
These preferential capital gains tax rates are a subject of debate as the 2020 
presidential election approaches.36  Those who favor preferential rates may 
emphasize:  (1) the distinction between nonrecurring capital gains and 
recurring income, such as that from wages and salaries; (2) the fact that 
preferential capital gains tax rates encourage market transactions, thereby 
remediating a lock-in effect of taxpayer retention of assets to avoid the 
otherwise greater tax implications of generating taxable income at ordinary 
rates; and (3) the various benefits of waiting until a capital gain is realized, 
such as increased administrative efficiency and taxpayer accessibility to 
liquid assets to pay the tax.37  Those disfavoring preferential capital gains tax 
treatment may emphasize that:  (1) a gain is a gain regardless of its form; (2) 
preferential rates increase vertical inequity because those with more income 
are more likely to have capital assets; and (3) preferential rates complicate 
the Code’s administration.38 
Though art remains a capital asset regardless of taxpayer classification, art 
is taxed differently according to the type of taxpayer.39  Corporations cannot 
benefit from preferential capital gains tax rates.40  Corporate capital gains are 
instead treated as ordinary income and taxed at a flat rate of 21 percent.41  
Further, 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, which include many public art 
museums, do not pay capital gains taxes.42  As a result, individual income 
taxes are most relevant to the issues discussed in this Note. 
2.  History of the Income Tax and the Sixteenth Amendment 
Federal income taxes raise revenue to fund government programs.43  
Congress’s decision to tax a source of income or to grant a deduction or 
exclusion therefore reflects a policy choice about which sources of income 
should be targeted to achieve this goal.44  In response to these policies, 
 
 35. See I.R.C. § 1411; see also Questions and Answers on the Net Investment Income Tax, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/questions-and-answers-on-the-
net-investment-income-tax [https://perma.cc/7CPK-STG3] (last updated July 22, 2019). 
 36. Bruce Brumberg, Capital Gains Tax Tug-of-War:  Democratic Presidential 




 37. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 566–70; see also Noël B. Cunningham & 
Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 344–70 
(1993). 
 38. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 570–72; see also Ed Dolan, The Case Against 
the Capital Gains Tax Break, MEDIUM (Aug. 1, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/the-case-
against-the-capital-gains-tax-break-48e9c39ef9a8 [https://perma.cc/WR7E-LQEB]. 
 39. Compare I.R.C. § 1, with I.R.C. § 11. 
 40. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 565. 
 41. See I.R.C. § 11. 
 42. See id. § 501(a). 
 43. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. 
 44. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537 (2012). 
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however, taxpayers seek to design transactions to minimize their tax 
burdens.45  A brief overview of case law reveals these competing interests 
and demonstrates a steady expansion of Congress’s pool of taxable sources 
to keep pace with the multitude of ways in which taxpayers generate 
income.46 
Though the Constitution originally laid out Congress’s general powers in 
the realm of taxes, it did not offer contours to shape the tax system, such as 
the substance and extent of permissible taxes.47  Article I, Section 8 grants 
Congress the broad, undefined power to “lay and collect taxes.”48  Article I, 
Section 9 prohibits “capitation, or [any] other direct tax . . . unless in 
proportion to the Census or Enumeration.”49  Yet the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law,”50 and the Tenth Amendment reserves any “powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution” to the states or the people.51  The subtle 
tensions between these clauses inevitably made their way into the courts. 
Judicial interpretation of the phrase “direct tax” expanded over time to 
encompass both personal property and real property.  In one early case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court took the position that, because direct taxes concerned 
real property, a sixteen-dollar tax on carriages was not a direct tax to be 
apportioned among the states.52  President Lincoln later expanded this 
interpretation when he signed the first official income tax, which was 
apportioned among the states by population, to finance the Civil War.53  The 
tax was challenged, but ultimately upheld, in Springer v. United States,54 
where the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that an income tax is not a direct 
tax, such as a tax on real property, and therefore income taxes need not be 
apportioned among the states.55  This holding, however, was short-lived.56  
In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,57 the Supreme Court reversed 
course and held that income taxes did constitute taxes on property and, as 
such, needed to be apportioned among the states.58  The limitations deriving 
 
 45. See, e.g., Arthur Acevedo, Abusive Tax Practices:  The 100-Year Onslaught on the 
Tax Code, 17 BARRY L. REV. 179, 184 (2012). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796) (opinion of 
Chase, J.). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 49. Id. § 9.  A direct tax is imposed on property, whether real or personal, “and presumed 
to be borne by the person on whom it is assessed.” Direct Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 571–72 (holding that a direct 
tax includes more than real property). 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 51. Id. amend. X. 
 52. See Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174–75 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 53. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
 54. 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
 55. See id. at 593. 
 56. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 57. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 58. See id. at 618. 
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from this holding likely motivated the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment 
in 1913.59 
The Sixteenth Amendment provides Congress with its modern taxing 
power, enabling Congress to tax income “from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration.”60  Throughout the twentieth century, the Sixteenth 
Amendment granted various administrations the power to experiment with 
different tax policies, reflecting the fluidity and continuous reassessment of 
equity in the American tax system.61  As a consistent thread running 
throughout this fluidity, the Sixteenth Amendment empowers Congress to 
tax gains derived from sales of personal property, such as art. 
3.  Recent Changes:  The 2017 Tax Act 
The 2017 tax act reflects the most recent conception of how income, and 
specifically capital gains, should be taxed.62  Its implementation marked the 
largest set of revisions to the Code since 1986.63  In accordance with 
promises made in his 2016 campaign, President Trump used the 2017 tax act 
to reduce corporate and individual tax rates, increase various deductions and 
credits, alter corporate taxation on income earned abroad, and double the 
estate tax exemption, among other changes.64  The Joint Committee on 
Taxation has estimated that these changes may generate a $1.5 trillion loss in 
federal revenue.65 
For the purposes of this Note, there are two especially relevant changes in 
the 2017 tax act:  (1) the elimination of section 1031’s like-kind exchanges 
for personal property such as art and (2) the implementation of a similar tax 
advantage for art investors through section 1400Z’s “Opportunity Zones.”66  
Prior to the 2017 tax act, like-kind exchanges enabled an art investor67 to 
 
 59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern 
Income Tax, 1894–1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 296 (2013) (discussing a political blunder that 
may have also contributed to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment); Benjamin G. Barokh, 
Note, The Meaning of ‘Incomes’ in the Sixteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & POL’Y 409, 411 
(2017). 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 61. See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 311–314, 111 Stat. 
788, 831–43 (reinstating the preferential capital gains tax rates); Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (amended 2017) (lowering the ordinary income tax rate 
for the top bracket, increasing the ordinary income tax rate for the lowest bracket, and 
eliminating preferential capital gains tax rates). 
 62. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 11. 
 63. Compare Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.), with Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 589, 589 (1997) (discussing how the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 was the “most sweeping change in the U.S. federal income tax since it 
became a tax that applied to most citizens during World War II”). 
 64. See GRAETZ ET AL., supra note 10, at 11. 
 65. Robert J. Barro & Jason Furman, Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017 Tax Reform, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2018, at 257, 261, 307. 
 66. Compare I.R.C. § 1031 (2018), with I.R.C. § 1400Z (2018). 
 67. The term “art investor” carries implications distinct from those associated with “art 
collectors,” which will be discussed in Part II.A. 
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defer paying capital gains tax for the exchange of similar works of art while 
simultaneously adjusting the art investor’s basis in the work of art acquired 
through the exchange.68  Art investors would benefit from this provision if 
they received property “of a like kind to the property” transferred and both 
parties had held the original property “for use in a trade or business or for 
investment.”69  Legislative motivations for section 1031 included the 
administrative difficulty of valuing assets in personal property exchanges and 
the notion that in a like-kind exchange, a taxpayer alters the form but not the 
substance of the investment and, as such, the taxpayer retains the bulk of his 
or her economic position.70  No matter the legislative motivation, however, 
this nonrecognition provision demonstrated the Code’s treatment of art as a 
common form of tradable investment property. 
Though the 2017 tax act eliminated the tax benefits for like-kind 
exchanges of art, the act implemented Opportunity Zones, a program that 
offers similar tax benefits to art investors alongside traditional investors.71  
Opportunity Zones therefore continue to reflect the Code’s treatment of art 
as tradable investment property despite changes in the 2017 tax act.  State 
governors designate, and the Department of the Treasury approves, low-
income census tract areas as Opportunity Zones for a period of ten years.72  
Any area that satisfies the definition of “low-income community” under 
section 45D(e) of the Code may be nominated.73  Alternatively, contiguous 
areas that meet exacting criteria may be nominated.74  However, no more 
than 25 percent of tracts of land in low-income communities can be 
designated as Opportunity Zones.75  Once the Treasury approves a tract as an 
Opportunity Zone, the “economically-distressed community” may “under 
certain conditions . . . be eligible for preferential tax treatment.”76 
The beneficial tax treatment occurs when art investors reinvest their capital 
gains acquired from the sale of art into “Qualified Opportunity Funds,” which 
are then utilized as “investment vehicles” to purportedly spur economic 
 
 68. Under the 2017 tax act, section 1031 of the Code now only applies to transactions 
involving real property. See I.R.C. § 1031. 
 69. Bradley T. Borden, Reverse Like-Kind Exchanges:  A Principled Approach, 20 VA. 
TAX REV. 659, 661 (2001). 
 70. Id. at 665–67; see also Century Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 
1951). 
 71. Despite the focus of this Note, any investor who generates capital gains may reinvest 
those gains in Qualified Opportunity Funds.  This is not limited to art investors. 
 72. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1); see also Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GROUP, 
https://eig.org/opportunityzones/about [https://perma.cc/2EJC-RZ63] (last updated July 22, 
2019). 
 73. See I.R.C. § 45D(e); see also Rev. Proc. 2018-16, 2018-9 I.R.B. 383. 
 74. See Rev. Proc. 2018-16, 2018-9 I.R.B. 383. 
 75. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1. 
 76. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/L79L-RQ7P] (last updated Oct. 22, 2019); see also Opportunity Zone 
Resources, COMMUNITY DEV. FIN. INSTITUTIONS FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/ 
Opportunity-Zones.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZPC2-H432] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (providing 
access to a map and list of all Opportunity Zones). 
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growth in Opportunity Zones.77  Though individuals may participate in these 
funds, the funds are organized as partnerships or corporations.78  For a 
taxpayer to receive tax benefits through these funds, at least 90 percent of 
fund assets must be invested in Qualified Opportunity Zone property.79  The 
fund must be used to either create a new use for Opportunity Zone property 
or to “substantially improve” existing Opportunity Zone property.80 
Through these funds, art investors can defer, or in some cases nearly 
eliminate, their capital gains taxes using one of two pathways.81  First, 
investors may “defer tax on any prior gain until no later than December 21, 
2026, so long as the gain is reinvested in a Qualified Opportunity Fund.”82  
The tax deferral is worth a 10 percent exclusion of the deferred gain if the 
investment is held for at least five years, or a 15 percent exclusion of the 
deferred gain if the investment is held for more than seven years.83  Second, 
if the investor holds the gain in the Opportunity Fund for at least ten years, 
the investor may increase the basis of the investment “equal to the fair market 
value of the investment on the date that it is sold.”84  This tax deferral grants 
art investors a greater time value of money and enables them to reinvest the 
amount of deferred tax elsewhere. 
The Opportunity Zone program aims to improve economic conditions by 
incentivizing private investment in public spaces.85  But it is estimated that 
the program will generate an annual average tax revenue loss of $1.6 billion 
over the next eight years.86 
Despite the changing mechanisms for receiving preferential tax treatment, 
this subpart has demonstrated that Congress has consistently aligned art with 
traditional securities, both before and after the 2017 tax act.  The ability of 
art investors to benefit from this preferential treatment is not new, and to the 
extent that the legislative history in the tax realm is revealing, this preferential 
treatment is unlikely to be eliminated any time soon. 
 
 77. Joseph Bennett, Note, Lands of Opportunity:  An Analysis of the Effectiveness and 
Impact of Opportunity Zones in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 45 J. LEGIS. 253, 254 
(2018); Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 76. 
 78. See Rev. Proc. 2018-16; see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1). 
 79. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2. 
 80. “Substantial improve[ment]” is defined as improvements alone with a greater cost 
than the cost basis of the property. See id. 
 81. See id.; see also Bennett, supra note 77, at 256. 
 82. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury, IRS Announce First Round of 
Opportunity Zones Designations for 18 States (Apr. 9, 2018), https:// 
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0341 [https://perma.cc/HM8F-XNPL]. 
 83. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 76. 
 84. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 82. 
 85. See Eileen Kinsella, Explaining ‘Opportunity Zones’:  The Trump Administration’s 
New Tax Break for Art Collectors, ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/trump-administration-tax-break-collectors-1436485 [https://perma.cc/ZH9A-GMEY] 
(discussing how the 2017 tax act closed one tax loophole but opened another loophole for art 
investors). 
 86. THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 6 (2017), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/ZA3D-
JU8X]; Bennett, supra note 77, at 258. 
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B.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Other Securities Law Terms 
The second legislative regime relevant to this Note is the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.87  Through the Act, Congress created SEC, a federal 
agency, to enforce the Act’s laws, all of which endeavor to enhance market 
stability and protect investors.88  The Act is particularly concerned with 
regulating corporate securities traded in the “public ‘secondary’ market.”89  
As state law enforces corporate fiduciary duties, the Act is primarily 
concerned with disclosures, reporting requirements, fraud, and insider 
trading.90 
Congress implemented the Act after the Great Depression to recapture 
investor confidence in American financial markets.91  Its regulations impact 
brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing agents, and self-regulatory 
organizations (such as the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, and the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).92  The Act’s current scope and 
statutory language indicate a legislative intent to protect transactions in 
which individuals rely on external factors in the market for their own 
economic growth.93 
The SEC employs the test developed in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.94 to assess 
whether an asset is properly classified as an investment contract and therefore 
subject to the securities laws under the Act.95  In that case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court looked to section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which defined the 
term “security” to include “commonly known documents traded for 
speculation or investment,” and sought to resolve whether a land sales 
contract fit this definition.96  Answering in the affirmative, the Court held 
that the SEC regulates “contract[s], transaction[s], or scheme[s] whereby a 
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits 
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”97  As SEC Chairman 
Jay Clayton recently summarized, the test essentially asks, “Am I giving you 
my money for you to go off in a venture where I’m relying on your efforts 
and the efforts of your colleagues?”98  Part II.B discusses how this test might 
apply to the secondary art market. 
 
 87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018). 
 88. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 617 (5th ed. 2016); see also What We Do, supra note 20. 
 89. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b; see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88. 
 90. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq. 
 91. See What We Do, supra note 88. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); see also S. REP. NO. 73-1455 (1934). 
 94. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 297. 
 97. Id. at 293. 
 98. Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won’t Change Securities Laws to Cater to 
Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 11, 2018, 9:35 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-
chairman-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-a-security.html 
[https://perma.cc/MBC6-9ZBA] (including a video interview by Bob Pisani with Jay Clayton, 
chairman of the SEC). 
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Once the Howey test leads to the determination of an asset as an investment 
contract, obligations under the Act attach to the practices surrounding that 
investment contract, such as the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  The duty of loyalty 
requires fiduciaries, such as directors and officers of a corporation, to 
“exercise their authority in a good-faith attempt to advance corporate 
purposes.”99  Part II.B also discusses how the duty of loyalty might develop 
in the secondary art market if the Howey test applied to works of art. 
An individual may breach his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty by trading 
on the basis of inside information.100  Insider trading “refers generally to 
buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship 
of trust and confidence, on the basis of material, nonpublic information about 
the security.”101  This vague definition, as well as the absence of clearly 
defined elements of insider trading, has generated blurry applications for 
quite some time.102  Recently, members of Congress have proposed a bill to 
assist in interpretation.103  For now, however, insider trading claims are 
brought under a statute concerning manipulative and deceptive devices.104  
The SEC has also issued a regulation to implement this statute.105  Together, 
these rules seek to eliminate fraudulent activities within securities markets 
by requiring a corporate insider to “disclose to the public the material 
nonpublic information in his [or her] possession relating to his [or her] 
corporation’s securities, or refrain from trading based on the information” 
when the insider has met a series of requirements.106  At this point in the 
process, federal common law steps in to fill in the gaps.107 
For example, Congress has left the definition of “insider” largely to the 
federal courts.  Though courts look to the Act and SEC rules to shape this 
definition, neither text defines the word “insider.”108  Broadly speaking, 
however, insiders are persons “under a duty of trust and confidence that 
prohibits them from secretly using such information for their personal 
advantage.”109  This duty has traditionally related directly to a publicly traded 
corporation and its shareholders, but Part II.B discusses other potential 
 
 99. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 88, at 229. 
 100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); see also Insider Trading, INVESTOR.GOV, 
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 101. Insider Trading, supra note 100. 
 102. See, e.g., Thomas Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Insider Trading—a U.S. Perspective, Address at Jesus College, Cambridge University (Sept. 
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 103. See generally H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2019). 
 105. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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Insider Trading?, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 101, 105–06 (2016). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading 2.0, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (2d ed. forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (on file with author). 
 109. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423. 
1522 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
contours.110  Lastly, inside corporate information may be defined as 
“material, nonpublic information,” either about a corporation and its 
activities or about the larger market.111 
Scholars debate the proper mechanisms to regulate insider trading.112  
While some scholars advocate for the SEC to investigate potential violations, 
others advocate for state prosecution.113  No matter the mechanism, however, 
the proliferation of technology certainly assists the SEC and the Department 
of Justice in monitoring insider trading.114  Using technology in a market 
surveillance approach, regulators may track the timing of trades and stock 
values to investigate insider trading.115  The SEC also sometimes relies on 
tips and complaints from others to detect insider trading.116 
This subpart has demonstrated that as trading markets grow, offering 
financial benefits to investors, legislators have implemented regulation to 
ensure equity and transparency in those trading markets.  Though the current 
application of those regulations is limited, its principles may properly apply 
to other markets as well. 
C.  The Art Market 
Defining art is tricky.  As economist and auction house professional Doug 
Woodham explained, “Unlike a hammer, a chocolate bar, or other objects of 
daily living, art has no practical value.  Its utter uselessness in performing a 
productive activity is key to its inherent charm and purpose.”117  The IRS 
took a broad approach to defining art through a revenue procedure,118 which 
considered art to include “paintings, sculpture, watercolors, prints, drawings, 
ceramics, antique furniture, decorative arts, textiles, carpets, silver, rare 
manuscripts, historical memorabilia, and other similar objects.”119  As this 
Note does not seek to provide a philosophical definition of art, no specific 
definition of art (whether an expensive painting or a banana duct-taped to a 
 
 110. See, e.g., Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 330, 335. 
 111. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997); see also Bainbridge, supra 
note 108 (manuscript at 16). 
 112. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 108 (manuscript at 43). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Crimmins, supra note 110, at 335. 
 115. Elvis Picardo, How the SEC Tracks Insider Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021815/how-sec-tracks-insider-trading.asp 
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 116. Id. 
 117. WOODHAM, supra note 16, at 1. 
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[https://perma.cc/YUK7-V2T7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
 119. Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-3 I.R.B. 41. 
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wall120) is as relevant to addressing the concerns of this Note as the means 
through which the material is traded.  In this sense, for the purpose of this 
Note, art is defined as any visual form that is traded in a secondary market 
for investment purposes.  Though the issues examined in this Note become 
more relevant in the context of significant art investments because of the 
higher economic stakes, the issues may similarly apply to smaller-scale art 
investments. 
The art market refers to the economic venue for the exchange of works of 
art.121  Initial sales of works of art take place in the primary art market, such 
as at galleries.122  The secondary art market encompasses subsequent resales 
of works of art, often at auction or in private sales.123  This Note is most 
concerned with the secondary art market because it constitutes a trading 
platform and can therefore be aligned with traditional securities markets.124 
As mentioned above, the global art market has grown substantially in 
recent years and the United States has retained the greatest market share.125  
Multiple factors contribute to this continued growth.  From a financial 
perspective, these factors include popularizing strategies to incorporate art 
into wealth management solutions,126 increasing public recognition of art as 
a valuable asset class,127 and evolving perceptions about traditional financial 
markets.128  The rise of “art finance” companies offering art as collateral,129 
firms offering financial solutions for those interested in art investment 
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markets,130 and quantitative investment firms concentrating in art assets131 
also exemplifies the growing nexus between art and finance.  From an 
industry perspective, the supply of and demand for an artist’s works in the 
market, the trading behavior of other art investors,132 the prevalence of an 
artist or genre in public discourse,133 and the publicity generated by museum 
exhibitions and gallery shows also foster market growth.134  Despite this 
market growth and the inclusion of art in investment portfolios, regulatory 
oversight of the secondary art market has remained remarkably low. 
Lastly, individuals can participate in the art market either as investors or 
collectors.  Traditionally, this distinction had profound tax implications, but 
the 2017 tax act curbed the benefits of the investor classification.135  To be 
considered an “art investor,” a taxpayer must engage in art transactions with 
the purpose of producing income.136  Prior to the 2017 tax act, investor status 
was preferential for taxpayers because it allowed taxpayers to take more 
deductions for the expenses involved in trading art.137  Under current law, 
however, many deductions are disallowed until January 1, 2026.138  In 
contrast, an “art collector” (also known as a “hobbyist”) may occasionally 
sell a work of art but his or her efforts are directed at building a personal 
collection.  Since the purpose of the collection is personal, expenses involved 
in building the art collection are not deductible, though preferential capital 
gains tax rates still apply when a gain is realized because each work of art 
remains a capital asset.139 
II.  CRITIQUING THE CANVAS:  EXPLORING THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF 
INVESTMENT PROPERTY 
Part I has provided the background information essential to understanding 
the difference in treatment between the IRS and the SEC in approaching the 
secondary art market.  The tax system includes art investments in its array of 
 
 130. See, e.g., ATHENA ART FIN., https://www.athena-art.com/ [https://perma.cc/JU6J-
P4J4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).  Further strengthening this business model’s connection to 
traditional securities, YieldStreet, “a digital wealth management platform,” purchased Athena 
Art Finance in April 2019. See YieldStreet Acquires Athena Art Finance from the Carlyle 
Group & Co-Investors, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:55 AM), https:// 
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190410005300/en/YieldStreet-Acquires-Athena-Art-
Finance-Carlyle-Group [https://perma.cc/95T7-SJT9]. 
 131. See ARTHENA, https://arthena.com/ [https://perma.cc/Y296-DFBM] (last visited Feb. 
14, 2020). 
 132. See Michael Findlay, The Value of Art:  Money, Power, Beauty, ARTNET NEWS (Nov. 
1, 2012), https://news.artnet.com/market/defining-the-value-of-art-27673 [https://perma.cc/ 
GP98-RNH6] (discussing the factors that contribute to the value of art). 
 133. See id. 
 134. For this reason, many art investors and collectors loan their works to museums as part 
of exhibitions. See Paul Sullivan, A Museum’s Seal of Approval Can Add to Art’s Value, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/your-money/a-museums-seal-
of-approval-can-add-to-arts-value.html [https://perma.cc/2SSJ-YW98]. 
 135. 26 C.F.R. § 1.212-1(c) (2019). 
 136. See id. 
 137. I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(2), 212 (2018). 
 138. Id. § 67(b), 67(g). 
 139. Id. § 262. 
2020] CASTING LIGHT ON THE SHADE 1525 
taxable assets.  The Act’s trading regulations, however, have yet to impact 
the secondary art market. 
Part II critiques the canvas that is the preferential tax treatment of art as 
tradable investment property despite the absence of any modified securities 
regulations of art.  This critique is especially apt in the context of the growing 
secondary art market in the United States. 
A.  Tax Implications of Art Investments 
Preferential capital gains tax rates, the now-expired like-kind exchanges 
for personal property, and Opportunity Zones each exemplify the Code’s 
tradition of treating art as a tradable investment asset.  The Code does not 
draw a meaningful distinction between art and traditional securities as it 
classifies both as capital assets and assesses the resulting taxes through the 
same process.140  This Part dives deeper into the technical elements of how 
that tax treatment works and posits why Congress may have taken this 
position. 
1.  General Tax Treatment 
As briefly mentioned, until the 2017 tax act, art investors could benefit not 
only from preferential capital gains tax rates upon selling a work of art but 
also from deducting the expenses involved in their trading endeavors under 
section 212 of the Code and taking loss deductions under section 165.141  The 
IRS, however, imposed strict requirements on the taxpayer before the 
taxpayer could take advantage of art investor status and deduct these 
expenses.142  These requirements likely derived from the fact that art is also 
personal property and those who trade in art can also engage in personal 
consumption in such a way that is not readily available when trading in 
traditional securities.143 
It is difficult to determine whether someone is an “art investor” for tax 
purposes.  The U.S. Court of Claims held in Wrightsman v. United States144 
that a taxpayer must “establish that [his or her] investment purpose for 
acquiring and holding works of art was ‘principal,’ or ‘of first importance,’” 
to be considered an art investor.145  This involved a fact-intensive inquiry.146  
The Wrightsmans did not satisfy this requirement despite the fact that they:  
(1) often consulted art experts; (2) maintained investment card records in a 
manner similar to those records in Mr. Wrightman’s oil and gas business; and 
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(3) catalogued their works of art.147  Instead, the court held that the 
Wrightsmans’ primary purpose in collecting art was “personal pleasure or 
satisfaction.”148  The fact that a large part of the Wrightsmans’ collection was 
kept on view in their personal residences in New York and Florida 
contributed to this personal consumption.149  As a result, the Wrightsmans 
could not deduct expenses involved in their art investing endeavors under 
section 212.150  Later case law reinforced that a taxpayer’s primary motive 
must be profit, and the evidence of personal satisfaction must be weak, for 
the taxpayer to deduct expenses involved in trading art.151  One scholar has 
diluted these concepts into fourteen factors that courts may consider before 
classifying a taxpayer as an art investor, which illustrates the burden of 
proving this status.152 
The burden of proving art investor status has encouraged individuals to 
develop other practices to acquire investor status and receive the 
corresponding tax benefits.  For example, free ports, offering tax-free storage 
to art investors, have become a popular venue for art storage.153  When 
individuals store art in free ports, they may avoid sales taxes and demonstrate 
that their primary motive for investing in the work was not personal 
satisfaction, as the works themselves do not hang on the walls of investors’ 
homes, but are instead locked in foreign vaults.154 
Interestingly, Mr. Wrightsman was a skeptic about traditional investments 
in the stock market.155  He admitted that a key motivation for the expansion 
of his art collection was his opinion that art was “an excellent hedge against 
inflation and devaluation of currencies” and an “appropriate asset[ ] for 
investment of a substantial portion of his surplus cash being generated.”156  
This perspective provides an early indication of how investors considered the 
art market to accomplish similar goals as traditional securities markets.  It 
also suggests that some investors looked to the art market to supplement 
traditional investments, thereby using both types of assets as part of a larger 
investment strategy. 
Under the 2017 tax act, art investors are treated more like art collectors.  
Section 212 of the Code, which previously offered individuals an itemized 
deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses” for the production or 
collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance 
of property held for the production of income, is currently suspended as a 
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miscellaneous itemized deduction under section 67(g).157  However, though 
art investors are currently treated more like art collectors and are disallowed 
a deduction for these expenses, both art investors and collectors can still 
receive beneficial capital gains tax treatment.  Furthermore, art investors may 
deduct a loss for a transaction entered into for profit under section 165(c)(2), 
but only if the loss results from casualty or theft.158 
In allowing art collectors and investors to take advantage of preferential 
capital gains tax rates after holding works of art for more than one year, 
Congress implicitly acknowledges that the income generated from art 
investments differs from traditional income sources, such as wages and 
salaries.159  Rather, the income generated from art investments is more akin 
to that generated from traditional investments in stocks and bonds.  As 
individuals look to structure transactions that minimize their tax burdens, 
capital transactions are compelling.  Currently, however, an additional factor 
lingers to render art investments even more compelling than traditional 
investments in securities:  the absence of trading regulations in the secondary 
art market.160 
2.  Special Provisions 
Though the 2017 tax act extended the Code’s recognition of art as a 
tradable investment asset, it shifted the focus from the investor classification 
to the mechanism for receiving preferential tax treatment.  There are three 
main differences in how this treatment works. 
First, only capital gains must be invested in Opportunity Zones, whereas 
the entire value of the trade was considered under a like-kind exchange.161  
Second, there is no investor exchange requirement to receive the tax benefit 
under the new Opportunity Zone program.162  Entry-level art investors and 
collectors who may not have other works of art to trade can still benefit from 
this special tax provision.  Third, and perhaps the largest difference in tax 
treatment between like-kind exchanges and Opportunity Zones, is a new 
mechanical requirement.  Previously, under section 1031, art investors 
themselves could defer their capital gains tax through like-kind exchanges.163  
Now, under section 1400Z, a legal entity must be formed before an individual 
can accrue the capital gains tax benefits.164 
The transition from like-kind exchanges to Opportunity Zones carries four 
principal implications.  First, art investors may be less inclined to put works 
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of art in the market at all because they have no interest in Opportunity Zone 
Funds and their ensuing technical requirements.165  This would reduce 
taxable transactions and shrink the amount of taxes received through art.166  
Second, some question the effectiveness of the presumed redistribution of 
wealth and trickle-down economics in Opportunity Zones.  Opportunity 
Zones may not improve distressed communities because the policy fails to 
include any grassroots elements of economic development.167  Further, 
Opportunity Zone investors need not live, work, or have a business in any 
particular Opportunity Zone to reap the tax benefits.168  As a result, 
Opportunity Zones may benefit only investors, often for large-scale real 
estate development projects.169  Third, the elimination of the like-kind 
exchange tax break for art, but not real estate, is an arbitrary distinction.  This 
issue may become more pertinent if the Virtual Value Tax Fix Act of 2019, 
which would provide capital gains tax breaks for like-kind exchanges of 
virtual currency, becomes law.170  Fourth, Opportunity Zones redirect 
investment opportunities from other places.171  This, in turn, clashes with free 
market investment notions of public economic growth.172 
Despite these concerns, Opportunity Zones are not an entirely new 
concept, and some speak positively about the expected benefits.  For 
example, some scholars point to the fact that the Opportunity Zone program 
generated benefits after Hurricane Katrina when Congress enacted the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005.173  Further, as Treasury Secretary Steven 
Mnuchin argued, “Attracting needed private investment into these low-
income communities will lead to their economic revitalization, and ensure 
economic growth is experienced throughout the nation.”174 
Whether one rejects or supports the concept of Opportunity Zones, the 
novelty and complexity of the federal program has created confusion.175  For 
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example, the process of investing in Opportunity Zones is technical and may 
strike the average art investor as unclear.176  Further, implementation of the 
program is messy, likely in part because of the rushed manner in which the 
2017 tax act was pushed through Congress.177  Ultimately, it is difficult to 
measure the success of the program at this early stage, in terms of both 
investor participation and public economic growth.178  Nevertheless, the 
mere establishment of the program continues to align art investments closely 
with traditional investments in securities. 
B.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Insider Trading 
As the Act and its insider trading regulations do not currently apply to art 
investments, this Note cannot discuss the treatment of art or the regulation of 
the secondary art market under the Act.  However, this Note will analyze 
elements of the Act, particularly its sections concerning insider trading, 
which may provide an effective and proactive approach to reconciling the 
Act with the Code and regulating the secondary art market. 
Part I.B.1 discussed the basic concepts implicated in insider trading, which 
are not clearly delineated in the law. The law only provides two broad 
provisions to prosecute insider trading: 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (also known as 
section 10(b) of the Act and criminally enforced by the Department of 
Justice) and SEC Rule 10b-5 (civilly enforced by the SEC).179  These rules 
seek to prevent the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in securities 
markets.  The jump from manipulative and deceptive devices to insider 
trading seems unnatural given the fact that those who engage in insider 
trading are not necessarily seeking to manipulate or deceive another 
individual.  This serves as just one example of how insider trading doctrine 
has become a “doctrinal mess.”180 
Some scholars posit that insider trading should not be regulated at all, in 
part because it is difficult to prove the direct harms of insider trading.181  
Other scholars may even support insider trading, arguing that if securities 
regulations prioritize efficiency, insider trading can only improve the 
efficiency of stock prices.182  At its core, however, a central justification for 
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investing public.183  This is a long-held, nearly instinctive notion in American 
jurisprudence.184  As early as 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
director of a corporation committed fraud when he bought stock from a 
shareholder knowing that the value of that stock was about to increase 
significantly because of a favorable contract.185  Once Congress 
implemented the Act, the case law has since revealed a long-term judicial 
puzzle to determine where the lines should be drawn for insider trading. 
1.  Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 
Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 provide the starting point for 
insider trading law.  Under section 10(b) of the Act, it is unlawful to use “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention” of SEC 
rules “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”186  Rule 10b-
5 added substance to this prohibition.  The rule renders three actions unlawful 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”:  (a) the 
“employ[ment] [of] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; (b) the 
making of any “untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”; and (c) the 
“engage[ment] in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”187  These prohibitions 
illustrate intent to curb investor attempts to manipulate information for 
personal benefit. 
2.  Initial Regulatory Approaches to Insider Trading:  Cady, Roberts & Co. 
In Cady, Roberts & Co.,188 the SEC initially interpreted the Act to impose 
an “obligation” on individuals to disclose information or abstain from trading 
when two criteria were satisfied:  (1) “a relationship giving access, directly 
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” existed and (2) the 
“inherent unfairness” resulting “where a party takes advantage of such 
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”189  
This broad approach to insider trading alludes to the SEC’s interest in 
fairness and the SEC’s protection of equal access to material information as 
its key approach to fairness. 
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3.  Equal Access Theory:  SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 
In response to Rule 10b-5 and the SEC’s ruling in Cady, Roberts & Co., 
the Second Circuit “initially took the aggressive position that any possession 
of relevant, material, nonpublic information gives rise to a duty to disclose 
or abstain from trading.”190  This position is articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co.,191 a case in which the Second Circuit held that those who 
transacted in or placed calls on Texas Gulf Sulphur stock after being apprised 
of a successful drilling discovery in Canada violated section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.192  The court emphasized Congress’s intent to protect “equal access 
to the rewards of participation in securities transactions” for all investors and 
held that the investing public should be subject to “identical market risks.”193 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. marks the judicial implementation of the equal 
access theory, which holds that “all traders owe a duty to the market to 
disclose or refrain from trading on nonpublic corporate information.”194  This 
holding contains two important assessments.  First, traders owe a duty to the 
market at large, not to any one constituency, to disclose material, nonpublic 
information or to abstain from trading on the basis of that information.  The 
imposition of this duty levels the playing field among investors by 
prohibiting an economic advantage for those with privileged insider 
positions.  Second, the expected value of nonpublic information, or whether 
that information is likely to impact an investor’s decisions, measures the 
materiality of that information. 
In the context of the secondary art market, the equal access theory may 
apply to anyone trading art who acquires material, nonpublic information, 
either about a museum, an artist, or even a work of art, because a duty is 
owed to the art market at large to promote equal access to information. 
4.  Fiduciary Duty Theory:  Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC 
In Chiarella v. United States,195 the Supreme Court held that the equal 
access theory imposed too broad of a duty in requiring anyone in possession 
of material, nonpublic information to either disclose the information or to 
abstain from trading.196  To rein in the scope of section 10(b), the Court held 
that an individual violates section 10(b) only when that individual acquired 
material, nonpublic information and had a fiduciary duty, arising from a 
“relation of trust and confidence,” to the party without access to that 
information.197 
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Dirks v. SEC,198 a case in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “a duty 
to disclose only [arises] where the inside traders [breach] a pre-existing 
fiduciary duty owed to the person with whom they traded,”199 advanced the 
fiduciary duty theory developed in Chiarella.  In Dirks, the Court also 
clarified that an outsider to the inside information who nevertheless receives 
a tip of such information may be a “constructive insider” if the outsider has 
reason to believe that the tipper breached a fiduciary duty in giving the tip.200 
Though the fiduciary duty theory may at first seem inapplicable to the 
secondary art market because the secondary art market does not involve 
fiduciaries in the traditional sense, this difference can be reconciled.201  
Museum directors, for example, may be deemed to owe a duty to their 
respective museums.202  Since museums have the implicit ability to affect 
prices in the secondary art market, and museums are also affected by prices 
in the art market, museum directors may in turn become pseudofiduciaries to 
their institutions, among others. 
5.  Misappropriation Theory:  United States v. O’Hagan 
The misappropriation theory advanced in United States v. O’Hagan203 
covers a different dynamic of insider trading by focusing on outsiders to a 
corporation who acquire access to inside information.204  The theory 
“premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who 
entrusted him with access to confidential information.”205  Even though 
O’Hagan, a partner at a law firm, did not owe a fiduciary duty to the issuer 
of the security, a client of the firm with material, nonpublic information, 
O’Hagan did owe a fiduciary duty to the other partners of the firm.206  
O’Hagan breached that duty by engaging in a “self-serving use of a 
principal’s information to purchase or sell securities.”207 
As will be discussed further, the misappropriation theory may apply to the 
secondary art market in the context of gallery or museum employees who 
may learn inside information from a trading platform, such as an auction 
house, and seek to make profits on the basis of that inside information. 
The case law reflects the evolving distinction between strategic trading and 
insider trading at any point in time.208  The SEC likely benefits from this 
evolving distinction because it allows for continuous tweaking of the 
elements required, which may deter some individuals from engaging in 
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insider trading to begin with because of the unclear scope of the law.209  Most 
relevant for this Note, however, are the elements that are common to the 
different theories of insider trading and their potential applicability to new 
asset classes.  The most essential element is the lingering prohibition on 
investor use of a deceptive device, such as inside information, to generate a 
personal benefit—financial or otherwise. 
C.  How This Regulatory Discrepancy Affects Art Investors and Policy 
Considerations 
Part II.A described how federal tax laws treat art as a tradable investment 
asset without any material distinction from other capital assets, such as 
traditional securities.  Part II.B analyzed the securities laws that apply to 
traditional securities to protect the integrity of those markets.  Since these 
securities laws do not apply to the secondary art market, this subpart 
highlights the effects of trading in that art market without comparable 
restrictions. 
First, auction houses are not required to disclose details about guarantees 
or irrevocable bids on works of art at auction as are trading platforms that 
deal with traditional securities.210  Individuals, however, may know more 
details about a work of art because of their own social networks in the art 
world or their special relationships with experts in the field.  These 
individuals may even pay a premium for information precisely because it is 
“tightly” held in the art market.211  Current circumstances in the secondary 
art market foster the monetization of a competitive advantage of inside 
information.212  As a consequence, individuals who cannot access this 
information may suffer the effects of price manipulation in the secondary art 
market.213 
Second, buyer and seller identities are often unknown in art 
transactions.214  While information about a work of art’s provenance may be 
available, that information may also be incomplete.  Indeed, museums 
sometimes make active use of incomplete information in designing placards 
that describe the work of art.215  This increases the possibility that an 
individual may invest in a looted or stolen work of art,216 which poses a 
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serious problem in the art market.217  Art investors rely almost entirely on 
the “due diligence of the dealer,” whether at a gallery or an auction house, 
for information without any regulatory requirements to ensure completeness 
or accuracy.218 
Third, and most broadly, individual art investors can make use of any 
inside information they may acquire for personal financial gain or benefit.  
Investors may receive this acquired information on an uneven playing field, 
either as insiders themselves or with insiders selectively sharing information 
with them.  This effectively silos the art market into uneven networks of 
information, which is becoming particularly problematic at the museum-
director level.219 
The central problem apparent in each of these examples is a lack of 
transparency in the art market that causes inequities and inefficiencies.  This 
problem, ironically paired with beneficial tax treatment, is not merely ripe 
for comparison and legal analysis.  At its core, this problem cripples the 
public’s confidence in investing in the secondary art market and heightens 
the barriers to entry.  As the SEC becomes more aggressive in prosecuting 
insider trading,220 and courts demonstrate an expansive approach to 
interpreting the relevant insider trading law,221 the SEC should more 
aggressively apply securities laws to the growing secondary art market.  
Insider trading concerns cannot be remediated without a broader 
understanding of the impact of insider trading on various markets. 
D.  Important Disclaimers 
Before presenting a resolution to this problem, two important disclaimers 
must be made.  First, the IRS and the SEC have different goals.  The IRS is 
incentivized to maximize revenues through taxes and expand its sources of 
taxable income wherever reasonable.222  The SEC, in contrast, seeks to 
protect investors in securities markets and strategically targets its 
enforcement efforts accordingly.223  These different goals require different 
approaches, and presuming that these agencies should take identical 
approaches to these assets would oversimplify this argument.  The 
differences between these agencies, however, do not eradicate the relevance 
of synchronizing the approach to and treatment of an asset when it makes 
sense to achieve the agencies’ shared goals of equity, efficiency, and 
transparency. 
Second, this Note does not advance the idea that art is synonymous with a 
stock or a bond.  Of course, there are differences in the process through which 
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each type of asset is exchanged and in the qualities of the assets themselves.  
In terms of process, art is not a perfect fit for the Howey test.224  Art only fits 
three of the test’s four elements:  individuals (1) invest money, (2) expect to 
earn profits, and (3) rely on external efforts (such as those by museums, 
galleries, and auction houses) to earn those profits.  Contrary to traditional 
securities markets, however, the money invested in the art market is not 
invested into a “common enterprise,” which constitutes the fourth element of 
the Howey test.225  There is no single exchange in the art market.  Though 
there is also no single place of exchange for traditional securities, exchanges 
in the art market occur in a more diffused manner.  Further, absent an 
arrangement between an art investor and an art dealer or consultant of some 
sort, no individual or entity owes the owner of a work of art a fiduciary duty 
for future behavior.  As a result of these differences between art and 
traditional securities, art may be less liquid than traditional securities 
markets,226 and it may carry greater inefficiencies than traditional securities 
markets.227 
The art market also differs from traditional securities markets in the 
substance of and information about the transacted assets.  For example, no 
two individuals typically own the same work of art in the way that two 
individuals may own an identical share of stock in a corporation.  Artists do 
not usually mass produce the same work as a “fungible commodit[y].”228  
Further, there are no price indexes assessing risks and returns in the art 
market or audited financials providing information about the value of works 
of art.229  The art market instead relies heavily on, for example, auction sales 
at the nation’s two largest auction houses, Christie’s and Sotheby’s, which 
function as a “duopoly” in the market.230  Museums may complicate the 
matter by keeping much of the market’s acquisition data in the dark through 
private transactions.231  This is changing, however, with the growth of 
resources such as the Artnet “Price Database.”232  Lastly, forgeries and fakes 
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render the art market particularly susceptible to issues involving fraud and 
restitution.233 
Though these differences are not irreconcilable, they must be 
acknowledged before proceeding with this Note’s resolution.  It is because 
of these differences that this Note proposes the application of modified 
securities laws to the secondary art market, rather than the application of 
securities laws as they presently affect traditional securities. 
III.  UNVEILING AN INTEGRATED RESOLUTION 
This Part unveils an integrated resolution to synchronize the disparate 
treatment of art under the Code and the Act.  It proposes that regulatory 
efforts should target investor motives and not mere asset classes.  As such, 
insider trading regulations should be modified and adapted to fit the 
secondary art market.  This Part also addresses possible pushback to this 
resolution. 
A.  How to Synchronize Disparate Treatment 
Despite the admitted differences between the secondary art market and 
traditional securities markets, investors in both markets share a core interest 
in generating financial gain.  Art investors exchange works of art in the 
secondary market to increase the value of their works, and the amount of 
increased value hinges on external factors.234  Investors in both markets also 
rely on information networks to achieve financial gain.  In the context of 
traditional securities markets, these are circumstances that have sparked 
regulation.235  In the secondary art market, however, these circumstances 
have yet to receive regulatory scrutiny.  Consider the shared investor motives 
and patterns in both markets, which in turn contour the dynamics of equity 
and efficiency in each respective market.  Efforts to reconcile the regulation 
of the two markets are worthwhile. 
To the extent art investors in a growing market reap the same benefits of 
preferential capital gains tax rates and other tax deferral opportunities (such 
as those provided through the investment of gains in Opportunity Zones) as 
investors in traditional securities,236 consideration should be given to 
broadening the scope of insider trading regulations to include the secondary 
art market, albeit in modified form.  The application of modified insider 
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trading regulations to the secondary art market would increase the equity and 
fairness of trading within that market, thereby bolstering investor confidence 
and lowering the barriers to entry. 
If the SEC is not willing to expand its definition of securities to art in its 
regular enforcement work,237 a new subdivision within the SEC’s purview 
should be formed to tackle these issues.  Creating a new division that broadly, 
but perhaps imperfectly, fits within the scope of the SEC’s work is not a novel 
concept.  In June 2018, the SEC created a new advisory position to adapt the 
SEC to “emerging digital asset technologies and innovations, including 
Initial Coin Offerings and cryptocurrencies,” which are also not identical to 
traditional securities.238  Taking a similar approach to the secondary art 
market would demonstrate the SEC’s awareness of that market as the 
substantial investment vehicle and trading market that it is today.  As the 
following paragraphs describe, modified insider trading regulations could 
apply to the secondary art market in various forms. 
First, a modified fiduciary duty theory can apply to museum, auction 
house, and gallery directors and officers.239  Traditionally, the fiduciary 
relationship arises between corporate directors and officers who have a 
relationship of trust and confidence with the shareholders of the corporation 
whose shares are traded.240  Though most directors and officers at museums, 
auction houses, and galleries do not owe a fiduciary duty in the traditional 
sense,241 these individuals can be deemed to have:  (1) a pseudofiduciary 
duty to their institutions or (2) an indirect relationship of trust and confidence 
with their customers or other investors in the art market who rely on these 
institutions to support the market.242  These relationships generate a need to 
curb insiders in the secondary art market from trading or tipping on the basis 
of material, nonpublic information acquired through their positions for 
personal gain and at the expense of others in the market.  As a result of this 
potential deception, coupled with the absence of direct fiduciary relationships 
at each of these institutions, a modified fiduciary duty theory can take root.  
In this context, the word “fiduciary” encompasses the more diffused 
relationships of trust and confidence that exist in the secondary art market.  
Though this modified theory may evoke elements of the broader equal access 
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theory,243 there should be less concern for overbroad applications given the 
uniquely diffused and unequal information networks in this market. 
To provide an example of this modified theory at work, suppose a museum 
director, D, learns that a particular artist, A, will soon be featured in an 
exhibition at a prominent museum in New York City.  The exhibition has the 
potential to significantly increase the value of A’s work, and the museum has 
not yet disclosed this exhibition to the public.  Rather than disclose the 
information to the public or abstain from trading on the basis of this 
information, D proceeds to purchase works by A in the secondary market.  D 
also tips a friend and fellow art investor, F, and F also proceeds to buy a work 
of art by A.  After the exhibition, D and F sell their works by A at a much 
higher price because the exhibition has increased the value of the works. 
In using D’s insider position as a museum director for D’s own personal 
benefit,244 D harmed the owners of other works by A whom he purchased 
from before the exhibition became public knowledge.245  F similarly harmed 
those owners.  Together, D and F engaged in manipulation and deception by 
relying on inside information and artificially affecting the market.246  If the 
museum later seeks to purchase a work of art by A, perhaps because of the 
success of the exhibition, then D’s manipulation directly affects the 
institution of which he is a fiduciary as a director.  Ultimately, these 
hypothetical transactions contribute to the existing negative perception of the 
secondary art market as a murky “network of undue influence.”247  Under 
this Note’s proposed resolution, the SEC may prosecute D and F for 
violations of modified securities laws. 
Second, if an individual does not have a strong enough relationship to 
justify the application of the modified fiduciary duty theory, the 
misappropriation theory or Rule 10b5-2 can apply to prevent museum, 
auction house, or gallery employees from improperly acquiring a personal 
benefit through the use of inside information at art institutions.  In other 
words, even where an employee may not owe a duty to another individual, 
an individual may still be prohibited from trading without disclosure when 
engaged in a network of inside information at his or her institution.  Under 
the misappropriation theory, the fiduciary duty is owed to the source of the 
information that an outsider acquires.248  This could apply in situations 
where, for example, outside counsel learns inside information when working 
for an auction house in preparation for a large sale.  Further, under Rule 10b5-
2, museum, auction house, or gallery employees may be liable for insider 
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trading if they have agreed to maintain inside information in confidence, yet 
proceed to share that information with art investors in breach of that 
confidence.249  Such agreements can often be found in the ethical guidelines 
of these organizations.250 
Aside from adapting elements of insider trading to the art market, scholars 
and art market experts have proposed other solutions that could support this 
Note’s proposed resolution to improve the murkiness of the secondary art 
market.  First, a more formal registry that tracks price histories of works of 
art “both at auction and in private sales” could be implemented in the 
secondary art market.251  Second, more efficient uses of financial technology 
could be incorporated into the secondary art market to provide “access and 
information to retail investors.”252  Together with modifying securities laws 
and regulations to apply to the secondary art market, these solutions are also 
effective mechanisms for supporting equity, efficiency, and transparency. 
B.  Addressing Potential Pushback 
As this approach is likely to be met with some pushback, this section 
responds to anticipated counterarguments. 
First, and most broadly, some may argue that the fundamentally distinct 
goals of the IRS and the SEC cannot be reconciled through a shared approach 
to the secondary art market.  This Note has acknowledged the differences 
between the IRS and the SEC, and this resolution does not seek to import tax 
principles into securities laws or vice versa.  However, this Note points to the 
shared purposes of the agencies, especially in promoting equity, efficiency, 
and transparency.  The IRS works to create an even playing field through a 
progressive tax system,253 while the SEC works to do the same by protecting 
investors from unfair and deceptive practices.254  With these shared purposes, 
this resolution aims to tie up loose ends in the secondary art market and, in 
doing so, better actualize the purpose of each legislative regime in its own 
right. 
Second, some may argue that insider trading regulations are problematic 
because they do not “advance” any “important federal policy,” yet they are 
incredibly costly.255  Though this argument may be valid, it does not justify 
deregulating trading markets altogether.  By working to protect the market 
and regulate insider trading, more people will invest in the market.  The more 
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voluminous the investments in the markets, the greater the opportunities for 
innovation and economic growth. 
Third, some may say let caveat emptor reign, especially in the notoriously 
convoluted art market.  This principle of “buyer beware” was popular as a 
corporate law concept in the nineteenth century.256  In the twenty-first 
century, however, equity concerns should trump caveat emptor in situations 
like these where a viable framework is readily available to remediate and 
clarify an especially murky market.257 
Fourth, art investors may criticize the practical implications of this 
regulation and wonder where the lines of these regulations should be drawn.  
Who is an “insider”:  a director at a museum?  A gallery owner?  A customer?  
An artist?  As noted above, however, the fiduciary duty and misappropriation 
theories provide helpful initial contours here.258  Further, the “material, 
nonpublic information” in the context of the art market can be understood as 
information that an entry-level art investor who conducts a reasonable 
amount of research cannot access on his or her own, such as a museum’s five-
year calendar or a gallery owner’s network of information about an artist’s 
future plans. 
Fifth, some may argue that the unregulated distribution of information in 
the art market contributes to investors’ success in this asset class.259  Surely, 
some investors’ success in traditional securities markets would also increase 
in the absence of insider trading regulations.  Increasing fairness in the art 
market does not eradicate, or even significantly impair, individuals’ 
opportunities for financial gain for those who strategically buy and sell art 
based on available public information about the works and the market. 
Sixth, some may reverse the approach taken in this Note and recommend 
that preferential tax treatment for art be eliminated in exchange for no 
regulations of the art market.  As this Note considered the recent growth of 
the art market to be a similarly important factor spurring the need for 
regulation, removing tax benefits (which would in turn generate greater lock-
in effects and disincentivize market transactions) is an underwhelming 
solution to this problem. 
Ultimately, this Note pushes the secondary art market into uncharted 
territory.  If this Note provokes thought and debate on the topic, it will have 
served its purpose. 
C.  Increasing Attention to Taxation and the Art Market 
In the debates surrounding the 2020 presidential election, discussions 
about how to increase equity in the tax system have become more relevant, 
particularly in the context of a growing budget deficit.260  The Congressional 
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Budget Office recently assessed that the federal budget deficit will average 
$1.2 trillion between 2019 and 2029.261  The topics of equity, efficiency, and 
transparency in trading markets, such as the art market where individuals 
may also benefit from preferential capital gains tax treatment, are interesting 
and pertinent angles of this greater discussion.  Improving conditions in 
markets that are traditionally thought to be reserved for wealthier investors 
may benefit the larger economy at whole. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has sought to expose the impact that the disparate treatment of 
the same asset by two different federal agencies can have on a growing 
trading and investment market.  As the art market continues to grow, 
modified SEC regulations regarding insider trading should envelop the art 
market to make it more equitable, efficient, and transparent.  Tax benefits 
should also be paired with greater oversight of the trading market in which 
those benefits are generated.  Though art differs from traditional securities, 
the similarities that art shares with traditional securities, as well as the 
motives that art investors share with traditional investors, justify new 
contours in art investment regulation. An investor motive–based inquiry is 
central to assessing this need for increased regulation in the secondary art 
market. 
The SEC should either adapt to enforce these modified insider trading 
regulations within its traditional structure or form a subdivision to 
specifically address trading issues in the secondary art market.  Without 
cohesive treatment of art as an investment asset, issues of inequity remain, 
hindering honest and fair transactions within the secondary art market and 
deterring the entry of new investors. 
 
 
 261. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:  2019–2029, at 7 
(2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-08/55551-CBO-outlook-update_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MA25-N9V7]. 
